Antioch Law Journal
Volume 1
Issue 1 vol. 1 Fall 1981

Article 18

9-30-1981

Compensation Neurosis: A Workers' Compensation Phenomenon
Kathryn V. Natale

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.udc.edu/antiochlawjournal
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Natale, Kathryn V. (1981) "Compensation Neurosis: A Workers' Compensation Phenomenon," Antioch Law
Journal: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 18.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.udc.edu/antiochlawjournal/vol1/iss1/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons @ UDC Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Antioch Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ UDC Law. For more
information, please contact lawlibraryhelp@udc.edu.

COMPENSATION NEUROSIS:
A WORKERS' COMPENSATION PHENOMENON
Kathryn V. Natale*
The developing battle of workers" compensation law related to
mental and nervous injuries has recently expanded to include the
phenomenon of compensation neurosis-one of the most controversial
terms in the medico-legal lexicon. 2 This comment will explore the
legitimacy and viability of compensation neurosis as a compensable
personal injury in the compensation context. The reader should take
note that compensation neurosis is in its infancy and that any vagueness with respect to the law or case analysis reflects the state of the law
today.
INTRODUCTION

Modern workers' compensation statutes protect workers who suffer illnesses "arising out of and in the course of employment."' 3 The
line of demarcation between that which does and does not "arise out
of and in the course of employment," however, is oftentimes unclear.
Claims for disabilities such as ulcers, heart disease and mental disorders, the etiology of which is often extremely difficult or impossible to
determine with certainty, present problems when trying to show a
connection between employment and the disability. Such disabilities
are usually either aggravated or caused by a myriad of factors and a
direct link to any one factor tends to be inconclusive. Compensation
neurosis, which has been described as "an unconscious desire to prolong compensation (not conscious malingering) or a fear that compensation will not be forthcoming," 4 falls into this gray area where the
causal relationship between the injury and the neurosis is unclear.
The term "compensation neurosis" is viewed by medical professionals as an "unfortunate term" in that it tends to shift the attention
away from etiology and dynamics and towards the resulting neurotic
reaction. 5 The term evolved out of the frequency of obsessive concern
Member of class of Antioch School of Law, 1982.
The term "workers' compensation has replaced "workmens'" compensation throughout
this comment in an attempt to reduce the use of sexist language.
2 Rev. Vol. 3, Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia of Personal Injuries and Allied Specialties, 243,
§ 20-27 (1970 and Supp. 1980).
See generally 1 Larson, Workmens' Compensation, § 6 (1980) for a summary of statutory
provisions. See also 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (1976).
W. Malone and M. Plant, Cases and Materials on Workmens' Compensation 306 (1963).
5 Gray, Attorneys Testbook of Medicine 104-103, § 104.71 (3rd ed. 1980).
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by the patient (claimant) with the prospect of receiving compensa6
tion, or with efforts to secure compensation.
Whether compensation neurosis takes the form of "an unconscious desire to obtain or prolong compensation, or of sheer anxiety
over the outcome of compensation litigation,"' 7 the manifestation
must be of the sort that will support "a genuine neurosis disabling the
claimant." 8 Professor Larson notes that:
Of the comparatively small number of cases that have been reported, a majority accept the compensability of genuine compensation neurosis. In Hood v. Texas Indemnity Ins. Co., for
example, . . . the controlling medical testimony was to the effect
that the claimant's disability would probably clear-up as soon as
the litigation was over, but that he was for the time being genuinely disabled by a neurosis caused in part by an 'unconscious desire
for compensation. ' 9
MEDICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

It should be noted that while the legal profession has recognized
and in the majority of cases compensated claims for compensation
neurosis,' 0 most medical authorities do not recognize compensation
neurosis as a "separate entity in psychiatric diagnosis and practice." I
Instead, the tendency is to view compensation neurosis as one symptomatic expression of an already existing neurosis.
Medical experts have linked compensation neurosis to "the psychological soil concept," and to the "peg principle."' 2 In essence,
these theories suggest that a predisposition to develop severe emotional
symptoms existed in the claimant's psychological profile prior to the
onset of compensation neurosis. The work-related injury, be it physical or otherwise, is regarded as a convenient "peg" upon which to
hang the neurosis. Presumably, if the underlying problem had not
manifested in the form of compensation neurosis, another manifestation might well present itself sooner or later, given suitable circum3
stances and sufficient psychological trauma.'

6 Id.
lB Larson, Workmens' Compensation 7-642, § 42.24 (1980).
8 Id.
Larson, "Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation," 23 Vand. L. Rev.
1243, 1256 (1970).
toId.
1 Supra note 2.
12 Cantor, Traumatic Medicine and Surgery for the Attorney 448 (1967).
13

Id.
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Compensation neurosis presents particular difficulty for the general physician, surgeon or psychiatrist who must form a diagnostic
opinion. The medical profession has observed that in cases involving
industrial accidents, neurotic exaggeration of the symptoms can develop following an injury. The neurosis may develop pursuant to
minor or seemingly insignificant injuries, complete with chronic aches
and pains, and any of all varieties of functional limitations. 14 These
exaggerated symptoms increase the physician's frustration in trying to
find an organic basis so that determining whether a physical injury is
or ever was present becomes difficult.
The case law is unclear as to the need for a physical injury
associated with compensation neurosis.15 It has long been understood, in the law of workers' compensation, that where "there is any
element of the 'physical' present, either in the cause or in the effect,
6
compensability is the virtually universal rule." 1
This old-fashioned adherence to some indicia of the physical
must be weighed against the complexity of this neurotic condition
which is no less meritorious and no less real to the claimant without a
physical element.
GENUINE NEUROSIS

As

DISTINGUISHED FROM MALINGERING

Genuine compensation neurosis has been distinguished from conscious malingering and, in fact, is often defined as "an unconscious
desire to prolong compensation (not conscious malingering)."1 7 The
importance of separating the genuine sufferers of compensation neurosis from the conscious malingerers places a considerable burden on
doctors, judges and compensation boards alike.
The use of the phrase in the absence of malingering, "opens up
one of the most elusive fact-finding difficulties in the law of workmens' compensation-or in the law of personal injury, for that matter.""' Malingering as it applies to workers' compensation has been
interpreted to mean "deception, practiced by a dishonest employee,
by feigning, inducing, or prolonging either sickness or injury, for the
purpose of securing illegal or fraudulent compensation payments." 19
Gray, supra note 5, at 104-102.
Is Schmidt's Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine (Supp. 1980) defines compensation neurosis
in part as: "manifestations of a mental disorder, as weeping, anxiety, weakness, palpitations,
etc., developing in a person after an accident in which (s)he sustained no injuries." The law of
workers' compensation however, tends to rely on a more stringent position with regard to a need
for physical injury.
16Larson, supra note 9, at 1260.
17 Malone and Plant, supra note 4.
Is Larson, supra note 7, at 7-648.
'9 Rexroat v. State, 142 Neb. 596, 7 N.W.2d 163, 172 (1942).
1"
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Unfortunately, compensation neurosis, like hypochondria, whiplash, certain types of back injuries and psychosomatic diseases tends to
elicit distrust,2 0 despite its debilitating effect on the claimant. As a
result "a considerable number of reported cases show denials attributable to the finding of malingering or its equivalent," 21 and "a substantial number reject the allegation of malingering, sometimes with a
trace of diffidence." 22 "[H]ow could it be real and compensable
when . . . petitioner was not consciously malingering, but was un23
consciously doing it with what the doctor said was the same result?"
The above quotation adequately depicts the sentiment of many
judges, lawyers and compensation boards. The assumption that "mental" is synonymous with unreal, or imaginary, or feigned is so ingrained that it has become a part of our idiomatic language. Expres24
sions such as "it's all in her head," for example, are not uncommon.
At one extreme there is a genuine victim of conversion hysteria,2
helpless in the grip of a condition he or she cannot control. At the
other extreme there is the conscious malingerer, "the kind of which
the Louisiana court said, 'the court believes this plaintiff is a
faker.' "26 In the final analysis the problem of determining whether
the worker is genuinely neurotic or malingering is one of fact, which
must be left to the skill and experience of medical and psychiatric
experts and of compensation administrators, who usually manage in
time to develop considerable facility in detecting malingerers at the
27
fact-finding level.
OVERVIEW OF CASE LAW

The criteria for proving compensation neurosis vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Because there are no established standards,
compensation neurosis is best explored on a-case by case basis . 28
20 It is often difficult for medical practitioners to isolate an organic cause with regard to these
physical ailments. Consequently, the possibility that a patient will feign or exaggerate his or her
symptoms is always at risk.
21 Minton v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Ariz. 254, 367 P.2d 274 (1961).
22 American Compressed Steel Corp. v. Blanton, 357 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1962).
2' Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 537, 209 S.W.2d 345, 354 (1948).
24 Larson, supra note 9.
25 Conversion hysteria has been defined as the conversion of psychic conflicts into physical
disorders. Anxiety, rather than being consciously experienced, is converted to functional systems
throughout the body that are innervated by the sensory-motor nervous system. 6 Traumatic
Medicine and Surgery for the Attorney 168 (1962).
20 Larson, supra note 7, at 7-653 (treatise cited).
27 Lucky v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 27 Ore. App. 565, 556 P.2d 712 (1976).
2' The following is a listing, by jurisdiction, of case law on the issue of compensation
neurosis. This updates a listing compiled by Larson, supra note 7 at 1273.
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The line between genuine compensation neurosis and conscious
malingering (as described earlier in this comment) is difficult to draw,
and the party alleging malingering has the burden of proof. The state
court of Louisiana, for example, will "stigmatize a claimant as a
malingerer only upon positive and convincing evidence justifying such
a conclusion. 29 This rule attempts to protect the already traumatized
claimant from additional suffering that could arise in the wake of
being labeled a liar and a cheat.
A less sympathetic standard has been applied in Mississippi where
a claimant who had a history of neurotic tendencies during childhood
was found to have "simply seized on a minor accident as an excuse to
30 Comexpress (his neurosis) in pain and other physical symptoms."
pensation was denied because malingering was established through
31
conclusive evidence.
Because it is difficult to measure the effects of anxiety and aggravation associated with one's employment, a thoroughly documented
psychiatric diagnosis/prognosis can help to establish a "genuine" case

Cases Awarding Compensation
California: Detjen v. Workmens' Comp. App. Bd., 422 Cal. App. 3d 470, 116 Cal. Rptr. 860
(1974); Illinois: United Airlines, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ill.2d 85, 405 N.E.2d 789 (1980);
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n 57 Ill.2d 257, 312 N.E.2d 280 (1974); Louisiana:
Doucet v. Ashy Constr. Co., 134 So.2d 665 (La. App. 1961); Minnesota: Welchlin v. Fairmont
Ry. Motors, 180 Minn. 411, 230 N.W.897 (1930); New Mexico: Ross v. Sayers Will Servicing
Co., 76 N.M.321, 414 P.2d 679 (1966); New York: Rodriguez v. New York Dock Co., 256 App.
Div. 875, 9 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1939), leave to appeal denied, 280 N.Y. 852, 20 N.E.2d 398; Texas:
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wilson, 522 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1975), rev'd 513 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ham, 333 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hatton, 252 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), rev'd on different
grounds, 152 Tex. 199, 255 S.W.2d 848 (1953); Washington: Peterson v. Department of Labor
& Indus., 178 Wash. 15, 33 P.2d 650 (1934); Wisconsin: Gallagher v. Industrial Comm'n 9
Wis.2d 361, 101 N.W.2d 72 (1960).
Cases Denying Compensation
Arizona: Motorola, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 125 Ariz. 211, 608 P.2d 788 (1980); Cheatham v.
Industrial Comm'n, 27 Ariz. App. 709, 558 P.2d 737 (1976); Connecticut: Kowalski v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 116 Conn. 229, 164 A. 653 (1933); Georgia: Swift & Co. v. Ware, 53 Ga.
App. 500, 186 S.E. 452 (1963); Rhode Island: Martino v. California Artificial Flower Co., 91
R.I. 91, 161 A.2d 193 (1960); Virginia: Keller Mfg. Co. v. Hoke, 215 Va. 525, 211 S.E.2d 82
(1975).
While the above-mentioned cases may seek to approach compensation neurosis as a viable
cause of action, the judicial opinions fall short of offering a conclusive set of elements which can
be used by the practitioner when attempting to prove or defeat a claim.
21 Istre v. Molbert Poultry & Egg Co., 125 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 1961).
30International Paper Co. v. Wilson, 243 Miss. 659, 139 So.2d 644, 649-50 (1962).
31 Conclusive evidence was based on expert testimony that claimant was psychoneurotic
prior to an alleged work-related accident, and that, in fact, if the accident "had not occurred the
psychoneurosis would have manifested anyway." (Id. at 650).

19811

COMPENSATION NEUROSIS

of compensation neurosis. Expert medical testimony can be a determining factor in either proving or defeating a claim for compensation
neurosis. Not surprisingly, judges and compensation boards, who recognize that "the line between (compensation) neurosis and malingering is not always sharply defined," 32 rely on medical testimony, sometimes to the claimant's unfair disadvantage. The Mississippi court in
Reyer v. PearlRiver Tung Co., 33 recognized this problem of imperfect
medical testimony when no doctor who had examined the claimant
could account for her alleged pain. In reversing a denial of compensation the court said:
The fact of disability by reason of pain, therefore, exists. The
inability of doctors to put their fingers on the exact physical cause
should not result in casting the claim overboard. With all of the
knowledge now possessed by the great medical profession, it is a
matter of common knowledge that sometimes the diagnosis of human ailments baffles the greatest medical minds.
In New York, a question of compensation neurosis or malingering
was finally settled in Montclair v. Griffith34 when the Board's own
medical examiner discovered that the claimant was suffering from a
mild partial back injury.
Both the Mississippi court and the New York Board exhibited an
unusual degree of concern in an attempt to give the claimant the
benefit of the doubt. Generally, however, courts will heed the advice
implanted in expertmedical testimony, as in Arizona, where a specialist in neuropsychiatry testified that "I would pinpoint it [the
claimant's condition] as a poor frame of mind toward his disability,
which the man has elected to adopt." 35 Compensation was, not
surprisingly, denied.
In Oregon, the Court of Appeals rejected a claim with all of the
attributes of compensation neurosis because of insufficient convincing
medical evidence. The court reasoned: "In complicated medical situations, only expert evidence can determine the causal relationship
between an industrial injury and psychiatric problems." 3 In addition to affirming the need for medical testimony, the Oregon court
touched on another consideration in attempting to prove compensation neurosis-the need for establishing that "the line of causation
37
from the original injury to the present disability is unbroken.
2 Supra note 20.
33 219 Miss. 211, 68 So.2d 442, 444-445 (1953).

- 19 A.D.2d 918, 243 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1963).
3 Supra note 19 at 7-654.
" Middleton v. State Accident Ins. Fund., 31 Ore. App. 313, 570 P.2d 406 (1977).
37 Larson, supra note 9, at 1257.
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Arizona recently denied compensation to a claimant who allegedly suffered from a compensation neurosis after having received a
notice of termination for benefits which were awarded for a prior
industrial injury. The court held that "the claimant's reaction to
notice of claim status terminating her benefits was an independent
superseding event which broke the chain of causation between the
initial industrial injury from which she had completely recovered and
her present psychological problems which were the result of her underlying personality traits; that is, an industrial claimant's admittedly
stationary condition cannot be rendered unstationary because of her
38
reaction to a notice of claim status."
The claimant, in support of her position relied on a California
case 39 bearing factual similarity. Arizona declined to follow the California court because "Arizona would not, absent unexpected, unu40
sual, or extraordinary stress, hold such neurosis to be compensable."
The standards for proving and defeating a claim for compensation neurosis are still evolving. Courts differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and from case to case (within the same jurisdiction) in
their willingness to recognize compensation neurosis as a genuine
personal injury.
CONCLUSION

Compensation neurosis has emerged as a viable personal injury
under the law of workers' compensation. While there are no precise
standards for proving or defeating a claim for compensation neurosis,
the following considerations consistently appear in favorable decisions
and are offered as a guideline:
1. conclusive evidence that a traumatic neurosis is genuine (supported by expert textimony);
2. a showing that the neurosis is related to the claimant's employment;
3. a physical injury or illness arising out of the employment that is
directly associated with the neurosis.
Because workers' compensation law is yet unsettled with respect
to claims of compensation neurosis, it is not surprising that with the
above-mentioned considerations present, a favorable decision is not
imminent. An Arizona court illustrated this point in 1976 when a
Motorola, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n 125 Ariz. 211, 608 P.2d 788 (1980).
Detjen v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 42 Cal. App.3d 470, 116 Cal. Rptr.
869 (1974).
40 Cohen, supra note 3 citing Sloss v. Industrial Comm'n 121 Ariz. 10, 588 P.2d 303 (1978).
3
39
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claimant who was injured at work was able to show the existence of a
genuine psychological manifestation (neurosis) stemming from a physical injury. Expert testimony, however, was introduced to show that
the best therapy for the condition would be to require the claimant to
41
return to work with no compensation benefits. The court so ordered.
Although steps have been made to further understand compensation neurosis in the law of workers' compensation, the "surface has
barely been scratched on the subject of neurosis in medico-legal
4 2
work."
The trend toward coverage suggests that the time is perhaps not too
far off when compensation law generally will cease to set an artificial and medically unjustifiable gulf between the physical and the
nervous .... The single question will be whether there was a
harmful change in the human organism-not just its bones and
3
muscles, but its brain and nerves as well.4
Cheatham v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Ariz. App. 709, 558 P.2d 737 (1976).
42
43

Gray, supra note 5, at 104-101.
Supra note 9.

